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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PIaintiff7Appellee, 
v. 
PATTI PRICE, aka PATTI PREECE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20010796-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
precursor and/or equipment with intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, a 
first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from first degree felony 
convictions pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal where 
she did not file a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's final 
judgment and her prejudgment motion did not toll the period for filing 
such notice? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
II. Did defendant waive her objection to an alleged variance between the 
charging document and the proof at trial when she rejected the trial 
court's offer to consider a continuance? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
III. Does defendant's failure to marshal the evidence supporting her 
conviction defeat her sufficiency of the evidence claim? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
IV. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for new trial 
where defendant has not shown that the alleged newly-discovered 
evidence was unavailable at trial or that it would have affected the 
jury's verdict? 
"A trial court's denial of a motion to arrest judgment is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion." State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 886 (Utah App. 1992). 
V. Does defendant's failure to adequately brief her cruel and unusual 
punishment claim defeat it? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules are attached at 
Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. 8; 
Utah Const, art. I, section 9; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1998); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1999); 
Utah R. App. P. 4; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance precursor and/or 
equipment and supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, a 
second degree felony (R. 4). The information alleged that the crime should be enhanced 
to a first degree felony because the lab operation took place within 500 feet of a residence 
and because it was capable of manufacturing methamphetamine ("meth") (R. 4). 
After a three-day trial, the jury convicted defendant as charged and, on a special 
verdict form, found both enhancements (R. 208-209). On December 5, 2000, the trial 
court rejected defendant's motion to reduce her conviction to a second degree felony, and 
announced sentence (R. 230-38, 255-56). 
On December 6, 2000, defendant filed a pre-judgment motion requesting a new 
trial (R. 259-60, 269-85). On December 7,2000, the trial court issued a Sentence, 
Judgment and Commitment without mention of defendant's motion (R. 255-56). On 
January 4, 2001, the trial court issued an amended Sentence, Judgment and Commitment, 
correcting defendant's sentence, again without mention of defendant's motion (R. 257-
58). On August 21, 2001, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 316-17). On 
September 12, 2001, defendant filed a notice of appeal (R. 319). 
The supreme court transferred the matter to this Court for disposition (R. 327). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 24, 1999, police officers located garbage consistent with meth labs and 
meth manufacturing alongside a road to Snowbasin (R. 329:92). In that garbage, officers 
found mail addressed to the home of Richard C. Hess, Jr. (R. 329:93). Based on this 
evidence, officers from the Ogden City Police Department, the Weber/Morgan Narcotics 
Strike Force, and the United States Drug Enforcement Agency went to Hess's home (R. 
329:94). With Hess's consent, the officers began searching Hess's home; after obtaining 
a search warrant, they then searched the bedroom in Hess's basement that defendant 
rented from him (R. 329:93, 102, 171, 174, 183-84). 
In defendant's bedroom, the officers found red phosphorous, pseudoephedrine 
tablets, empty iodine jars, hydrochloric acid, and numerous funnels, beakers, and 
tupperware containers (R. 329:101,176-77; R. 330:145-46). The first three items are 
precursors for manufacturing meth (R. 330:154-55, 161, 175-76). The remaining items 
are commonly associated with meth production (R. 330:135-36, 145-46). Defendant's 
room was the only room in which precursors were found (R. 329:170; R. 330:155). 
Also inside defendant's room, the officers found two day-planners identifying 
defendant as their owner (R. 329:112-13,117-18). The planners and other papers in 
defendant's room contained various recipes for making meth, shopping lists for meth 
ingredients, and lists identifying meth purchasers, the amount of their purchase, and the 
value of their purchase (R. 329:110-12, 124-29, 131, 133; R. 330:177, 179-85). No 
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similar items were found outside of defendant's room (R. 329:170). Letters in the room 
indicated defendant had been there within the month (R. 329:172). Defendant's 
boyfriend confirmed that she had stayed there in February (R. 330:223). 
Equipment and supplies for making meth, and a partially connected meth lab, were 
found in a storage room next to defendant's bedroom (R. 329:180; R. 330:99, 139-42, 
173). Hess and his girlfriend both witnessed defendant producing meth with that lab (R. 
329:192, 195-97, 201; R. 330:63). 
Nothing connected to the production of meth was found in the upstairs portion of 
the house, where Hess and his girlfriend stayed (R. 329:136, 160, 170, 184, 206-07). 
Hess was addicted to meth, however, and sometimes purchased precursors or equipment 
for defendant in exchange for finished product (R. 329:200-02). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal. Under the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, a defendant must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the 
final order from which she is appealing. Here, defendant's final order was entered on 
January 4, 2001. However, her notice of appeal was not filed until September 12, 2001, 
246 days later. Although defendant did file a premature motion for new trial, that 
untimely motion did not toll the period for filing a notice of appeal. Thus, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider her appeal. 
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Even if this Court reaches defendant's claims, they fail. First, defendant 
challenges an alleged variance between the date of the crime stated on the charging 
document and the date proven at trial. However, a defendant waives her right to 
challenge such a variance if she fails to move for a continuance at trial. Here, defendant 
not only did not move for a continuance on her own but rejected the trial court's offer for 
one. Thus, defendant waived this claim. 
Second, defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. 
However, defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Thus, her 
claim fails. 
Third, defendant claims the trial court should have granted her a new trial based on 
newly-discovered evidence. To warrant a new trial on this basis, defendant must show 
that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at trial, that the evidence 
is not merely cumulative, and that the evidence makes a different result probable on 
retrial. Here, defendant did not carry that burden. Thus, her claim fails. 
Finally, defendant claims that the clandestine lab statute requiring a mandatory 
prison sentence where the jury finds certain aggravating factors is cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions. However, defendant cites 
to none of the dispositive state or federal case law. Thus, this Court should reject her 
claim as inadequately briefed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL WHERE SHE DID NOT FILE A TIMELY 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S FINAL 
JUDGMENT AND HER UNTIMELY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
DID NOT TOLL THE PERIOD FOR FILING SUCH NOTICE 
On appeal, defendant challenges her conviction and sentence for possession of 
controlled substance precursors and equipment with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
meth lab. Aplt. Br. at 21-38. However, because defendant did not file a timely notice of 
appeal from the trial court's final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider her 
claims. 
A. Proceedings below. 
Defendant's sentencing hearing was held on December 5, 2000 (R. 255-56). At 
that time, the trial court announced defendant's sentence (R. 255-56). 
On December 6, 2000, defendant filed a motion requesting a new trial (R. 259-60, 
269-85). 
On December 7, 2000, the trial court issued a Sentence, Judgment and 
Commitment without mention of defendant's motion (R. 255-56). The judgment, 
however, incorrectly sentenced defendant to only one-to-fifteen years in prison (Id.). 
On January 4, 2001, the trial court issued an amended Sentence, Judgment and 
Commitment, correcting defendant's sentence to reflect a five years to life sentence, again 
without mention of defendant's motion (R. 257-58). 
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On August 21, 2001, the trial court denied defendant's pre-judgment motion (R. 
316-17). 
On September 12, 2001, defendant filed a notice of appeal (R. 319). 
B. This Court lacks jurisdiction over this case because defendant's 
notice of appeal, filed 246 days after the trial court's final order, 
was not timely. 
"It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a 
jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 
676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1985), superceded by statute on other grounds, as stated in 
Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 12, 29 P.3d 1225. Here, defendant failed to timely 
perfect her appeal. Thus, defendant's appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Under rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a defendant has "30 days after 
the entry of the judgment or order appealed from" within which to file a notice of appeal. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a). In this case, the trial court's final order was entered on January 4, 
2001 (R. 257-58). See ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, f 11, 998 P.2d 254 
(holding that where amendment to judgment changes "'material matter'" in judgment, 
time under rule 4(a) runs from date of amended judgment); Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 
130, 132 (Utah 1994). However, defendant did not file her notice of appeal until 246 
days later (R. 319). Thus, unless some exception to rule 4(a) applies, defendant's notice 
was not timely, and her appeal must be dismissed. Prowswood, Inc., 676 P.2d at 955. 
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Rule 4(b) identifies the relevant exception: "[I]f a timely motion under Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure is filed . . . under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial." Utah R. App. 4(b). 
However, "[a]n untimely motion . . . has no effect on the running of the time for filing a 
notice of appeal." Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982). 
Here, defendant's notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of entry of the trial 
court's order denying her motion for new trial (R. 319). Thus, the determinative question 
is whether her motion was timely filed so as to extend the time for perfecting her appeal. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a motion for new trial 
"shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as 
the court may fix during the ten-day period." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) (emphasis added). 
A motion filed prior to imposition of sentence is not timely under this rule. State v. 
Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah App. 1998) (per curiam) (holding motion filed after 
conviction but before sentencing is premature and untimely); State v. Putnik, 2001 UT 
App 182 (memorandum decision) (per curiam) (same), cert granted 32 P.3d 249 (Utah 
2001); cf Or em City v. Wight, 2001 UT App 235 (memorandum decision) (per curiam) 
(holding "motion to arrest judgment cannot be construed as a motion for new trial 
because it was filed after conviction, but prior to sentencing"). 
In Utah, a sentence is not imposed until final judgment is actually entered. State v. 
Wright, 904 P.2d 1101,1102 (Utah App. 1995) (affirming trial court's conclusion that 
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"there is not sentence untir the trial court signs the judgment); State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 
1150, 1151 (Utah App. 1991) (same). 
Thus, a motion for new trial filed before entry of final judgment is also filed before 
imposition of sentence. See State v. Gardner, 2001 UT 41, % 8, 23 P.3d 1043 (referring to 
date judgment, sentence, and commitment was signed in determining whether defendant's 
motion for new trial was timely); Vessey, 957 P.2d at 1240 (equating "entry of judgment" 
with "imposition of sentence" in applying rule 24(c)). 
Such a motion is not timely under rule 24. Gardner, 2001 UT 41, at f 8; Vessey, 
957 P.2d at 1240 (holding rule 24(c) simply "does not provide for timeliness of motions 
filed after announcement, but prior to entry of judgment"). Thus, such a motion does not 
toll the period for filing a notice of appeal. Vessey, 957 P.2d at 1240. 
Here, defendant's motion for new trial was filed December 6, 2000 (R. 259-60). 
However, sentence was not imposed until the trial court's final amended order was 
entered on January 4, 2001 (R. 257-58). Thus, defendant's motion was premature and 
untimely under criminal rule 24 and did not extend the period for filing a notice of appeal 
under appellate rule 4(b). Utah R. Crim. P. 24; Utah R. App. P. 4(b); Putnik, 2001 UT 
App 182; Vessey, 957 P.2d at 1240; Wright, 904 P.2d at 1101; Curry, 814 P.2d at 1151. 
Consequently, defendant's notice of appeal had to be filed within the thirty-day 
period set forth in appellate rule 4(a) in order to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Utah 
R. App. P. 4(a). Therefore, defendant had thirty days from the trial court's final January 
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4, 2001 order—or until February 3, 2001—to file a notice of appeal (R. 257-58). Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a). Because defendant did not file her notice of appeal until September 12, 
2001 (R. 319), this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider her claims. Prowswood, Inc., 676 
P.2dat955. 
II. DEFENDANT WAIVED HER OBJECTION TO AN ALLEGED 
VARIANCE BETWEEN THE CHARGING DOCUMENT AND THE 
PROOF AT TRIAL WHEN SHE REJECTED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
OFFER TO CONSIDER A CONTINUANCE 
Defendant claims the trial court should have granted her motion to dismiss at the 
close of the State's case because the charging document "alleg[ed] a distinct offense with 
the specific date of March 24, 2000," and "the State's evidence at trial indicates that any 
possible offense would have taken place at least 2-3 weeks prior to [that date]." Aplt. Br. 
at 21. However, defendant waived this claim below when she rejected the trial court's 
offer to grant her a continuance if necessary to meet the State's case. 
"[T]he failure of a defendant to seek a continuance negates any claim of surprise 
and amounts to a waiver of any claim of variance." State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1215-
16 (Utah 1987). 
Here, defendant raised her variance claim at the end of the State's case-in-chief (R. 
330:199). After hearing argument, the trial court stated: 
I will listen to whatever prejudice was caused and if necessary, allow 
you a continuance if I feel that the prejudice would allow you to cure 
that if I gave you a continuance I'm not going to dismiss it, but 
I'll listen to anything you have to proffer regarding prejudice and if 
that will justify a continuance. 
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(R. 330:207). Defendant rejected the trial court's offer, stating: "I submit it's such a 
material variance standing up the evidence at this point in time, that continuance would 
not do—would not make any change" (R. 330:208). In response, the trial court ruled that, 
"absence of a showing of failure to give reasonable notice as to what general timeframe 
[sic] we're talking about and absent a request for continuance, I'm not going to grant the 
motion to dismiss" (R. 330:209). 
Thus, defendant not only never sought a continuance in the trial court but in fact 
affirmatively rejected the trial court's offer to consider one. 
Consequently, defendant waived this claim below. Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1216. 
III. DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
DEFEATS HER SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE CLAIM. 
Defendant claims "the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law" to convict her 
of possession of controlled substance precursors and lab equipment on the theory of 
construction possession. Aplt. Br. at 28-31. However, defendant's claim fails because 
she has not marshaled the evidence. 
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, a defendant 
"'must first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate 
how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the 
verdict.'" State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, f 25, 989 P.2d 503 (quoting State v. 
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)). "[T]o properly discharge [this] duty . . . , 
the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
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competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the [defendant] 
resists." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, f 6, 36 P.3d 533 (citing West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Ca, 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991)). "After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2dat 1315. 
Here, defendant has not met her marshaling burden. Most notably, her argument 
does not contain a single citation to the record. Aplt. Br. at 28-31. Moreover, her 
Statement of Facts provides only vague references to the State's most damning evidence. 
Aplt. Br. at 8-21. Cf. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315 ("[T]he marshaling concept 
does not reflect a desire to merely have pertinent excerpts from the record readily 
available to a reviewing court."). 
Thus, defendant never marshals the following evidence directly implicating her in 
the possession of precursors and lab equipment for the production of meth: 
that pseudoephedrine, red phosphorous, and iodine are controlled 
substance precursors for the production of meth (R. 330:154-55, 
161, 175-76); 
that all three of these precursors were found in defendant's room (R. 
329:101, 176-77; R. 330:145-46); 
that such precursors were not found in any other room in Hess's house (R. 
329:170; R. 330:155); 
that, along with these precursors, hydrochloric acid, funnels, beakers, 
and tupperware containers—all commonly associated with meth 
production—were also found in defendant's room (R. 329:101, 176-
77; R. 330:135-36, 145-46); 
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that, along with these items, numerous meth recipes, lists of meth 
ingredients, and lists disclosing meth sales were also found in her 
room (R. 329:110-12, 124-29, 131, 133; R. 330:177, 179-85); 
that most of these incriminating papers were found in defendant's 
day-planners (R. 329:112-13, 117-18); 
that no such papers were found in any other room in Hess's house 
(R. 329:170); 
that mail found in defendant's room indicated she had been there 
within the month (R.329:172). 
Because defendant never marshals this evidence, she necessarily fails to 
demonstrate the "fatal flaw" in it. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. In any case, this 
evidence, combined with testimony from two eyewitnesses that they had seen defendant 
making meth in Hess's home, is sufficient to sustain her conviction. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 58-37d-4, 58-37d-5 (setting forth elements of crime); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ffl[ 
13-15, 985 P.2d 911 (discussing factors relevant to prove constructive possession); State 
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (setting forth standard of review applicable to 
jury verdicts). 
Consequently, defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHERE SHE HAS NOT SHOWN 
THAT THE ALLEGED NEWLY- DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS 
UNAVAILABLE AT TRIAL OR THAT IT WOULD HAVE 
AFFECTED THE JURY'S VERDICT 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied her request for a new trial 
based on newly-discovered evidence because an affidavit "discovered after the trial" 
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indicated that the State's witness, Richard Hess, had given testimony at trial concerning 
who was responsible for the Snowbasin dump that conflicted with the people he named in 
the affidavit. Aplt. Br. at 32. Defendant asserts a new trial was warranted based on this 
affidavit because "the credibility of Richard Hess was the essential factual issue in this 
trial before the jury." Aplt. Br. at 32. However, defendant has not shown that the 
evidence was unavailable during trial or that it would have made a different result 
probable on retrial. Thus, her claim fails. 
A. Proceedings below. 
At trial, the jury heard the following evidence: 
On March 24, 1999, police officers located garbage consistent with meth labs and 
meth manufacturing alongside a road to Snowbasin (R. 329:92). In that garbage, officers 
found mail containing the address of 5883 West Wasatch Drive, Mountain Green, Utah 
(R. 329:93). Officers recognized the address as where Richard C. Hess, Jr., lived (R. 
329:93). Based on this evidence, officers went to Hess's home (R. 329:94). When the 
officers confronted Hess concerning the garbage, Hess named several people who were 
involved in manufacturing meth (R. 329:103). Those names were never disclosed at trial. 
Concerning the meth lab found in his home, Hess testified that defendant and a 
man named "Cowboy Dave" had brought it there late the previous year (R. 329:192-93). 
Hess admitted that he was addicted to meth and that he had assisted defendant in making 
meth in his home in exchange for some finished product (R. 329:200-01). He also 
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admitted that he sometimes had parties at his house in which his friends, including Bnan 
Rowley and Dave Jabzneski, used meth (R. 329:206). Finally, Hess acknowledged that 
he had entered into a favorable deal with the prosecutor whereby numerous charges 
against him were dropped in exchange for his testimony against defendant (R. 329:185). 
After trial, defendant filed a motion entitled "Motion for New Trial," claiming 
that, "[a]fter the trial newly discovered evidence was obtained that indicated that the 
primary witness Richard Hess had made contrary statements concerning the dumping of 
garbage which led to the investigation in this matter which were not known at the time of 
trial" (R. 259-61). Defendant claimed that the affidavit was relevant because, at trial, 
Hess "stated the person that dumped the lab material at Snow Basin was 'Cowboy Dave,' 
a person associated with [her]" but in the affidavit, Hess "claimed that there were two 
different persons responsible for the act" (R. 283). 
The "newly-discovered" affidavit stated, in relevant part: 
Your Affiant was also involved in the investigation of a 
Methamphetamine Lab dump site located near Snow Basin. . . . 
When suspects were interviewed by Agent Griffel with the United 
states Forest Service, and asked about the dumping site, Richard 
Hess one of the suspects who had been manufacturing 
methamphetamine, told agent Griffel that they had compiled a large 
amount of waste and by product due to the manufacturing 
Richard Hess explained that Patti Preece had asked Brian Rowley to 
dispose of the items for exchange for some finished product. 
Richard Hess had explained . . . that Patti Preece had gotten to know 
Brian Rowley after he had fixed her vehicle and she had supplied 
him with some methamphetamine for his services. Richard Hess 
also explained Pattie Preece had learned to trust Brian and asked him 
to dispose of the waste items. Richard Hess then explained that 
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Brian Rowley and David Jabzneski had gotten a U-Haul trailer and 
took the items to Brian Rowley's home located in Northern Ogden.. 
. . Brian[']s wife Brandi Rowley got very upset with Brian for 
bringing the items to their home. Brian and David then took the 
waste items to Snow Basin and dumped the items off of a cliff from 
the road. (These items were later located and taken into custody by 
DEA and the Weber Morgan Narcotic Strike Force.) Brian Rowley 
had received about a 1/4 to Vi ounce of methamphetamine for this 
service. Richard Hess has signed a Affidavit to this information, 
with the Forest Service. 
(R. 292). 
After the State had filed its response and defendant her reply, defendant moved to 
submit her motion on the memoranda (R. 303-04, 310, 314-15). 
The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motion, ruling: 
[T]he "newly discovered evidence" that defendant refers to is 
the type of evidence that reasonably could have been discovered by 
the defense in advance of trial. Furthermore, it is not the type of 
evidence that reasonably can be construed to have materially affected 
the outcome of this case. (See arguments in the State's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for New Trial.) 
(R.317). 
B. Defendant cannot show the affidavit warranted a new trial. 
To secure a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, "'the moving party 
must show that the evidence . . . ( i ) . . . could not, with reasonable diligence, have been 
discovered and produced at trial; (ii) it is not merely cumulative; and (iii) it must make a 
different result probable on retrial.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, % 27, 25 P.3d 985 
(quoting State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, % 5, 984 P.2d 975). 
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In this case, no evidentiary hearing was held on defendant's motion. Thus, 
defendant presented no evidence to support her contention that the "newly discovered" 
affidavit was not available to her prior to trial. Defendant bears the burden of creating an 
adequate record below to allow this Court to review her claims. See Rudolph v. Galetka, 
2002 UT 7, \ 8, 43 P.3d 467; State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998). 
Absent an adequate record, this Court presumes the propriety of the trial court's decision. 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If 11, 12 P.3d 92; Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162. 
Moreover, defendant has not shown that the outcome would probably be different 
for her if a new trial was granted. First, contrary to defendant's claim, Hess never 
identified "Cowboy Dave" as the person responsible for the Snowbasin dump. Thus, 
evidence that Hess named Brian Rowley and David Jabzneski as involved in the dump 
was not inconsistent with Hess's trial testimony. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
the "newly discovered" evidence is replete with references to defendant as an active 
participant in the production of meth (R. 292). Thus, defendant cannot show that this 
evidence "'make[s] a different result probable on retrial.'" Boyd, 2001 UT 30, at f 27 
(citation omitted). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
V. DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF HER CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAIM DEFEATS IT 
Defendant claims that her sentence under the clandestine lab statute—which 
excludes a person from probation and disallows entry of judgment for a lower category of 
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offense, thereby imposing a mandatory five-years-to-life sentence—"constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment" because the sentence is "excessive" and "disproportional to the 
punishment for other non-drug offenses." Aplt. Br. at 36. Defendant's claim fails because 
it is inadequately briefed. 
Under rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant's brief 
must contain an argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires citation 
to "'pertinent authority,'" State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) 
(citations omitted), and "reasoned analysis based on that authority," State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989). Utah courts have consistently refused to consider issues that have not been 
adequately briefed. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304-05; State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 
602 (Utah App. 1992); see also MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-49 (Utah 1998); 
Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996); Burns v. Summerhays, 927 
P.2d 197, 198 (Utah App. 1996). 
Here, defendant challenges her minimum mandatory five-year sentence under both 
the Utah and United States Constitutions. Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor 
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not 
be treated with unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, art. I, section 9. Under this provision, 
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4[a] criminal punishment is cruel and unusual [only] if it is 'so disproportionate to the 
offense committed that it "shock[s] the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is 
right and proper under the circumstances.'"" State v. Lajferty, 2001 UT 19, f 73, 20 P.3d 
342 (quoting State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, f 33, 993 P.2d 854 (additional citation 
omitted)). However, "[s]ince sentencing statutes are necessarily based on numerous, 
imprecise considerations, substantial deference must be accorded to the prerogatives of 
legislative power 'in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.'" 
State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). Thus, "absent a 
showing that a particular punishment is 'cruelly inhumane or disproportionate,' [this 
Court is] not apt to substitute [its] judgment for that of the legislature regarding the 
wisdom of a particular punishment.'" Lajferty, 2001 UT 19, at f 74 (quoting State v. 
Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1377-78 (Utah 1996)); Herrera, 1999 UT 64, f 37. 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, amend 8. Under this provision, criminal 
punishments are cruel and unusual "'if they are excessive or contravene evolving 
standards of decency and human dignity.'" Lajferty, 2001 UT 19, at f 76 (quoting Mace, 
921 P.2d at 1377); Herrera, 1999 UT 64, at f 46. 
Under both provisions, "'a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the 
judgment of the representatives of the people."' Lajferty, 2001 UT 19, at 1 66 (quoting 
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Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 824 (Utah 1980)). Here, defendant's inadequately 
briefed argument does not meet that burden. 
Specifically, a plethora of Utah cases exist that defeat defendant's claim. See State 
v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1990) (holding "minimum mandatory sentencing 
provisions for certain felonies are identical for analytical purposes when determining their 
constitutionality" and upholding minimum mandatory sentence for aggravated kidnaping 
against cruel and unusual punishment challenge); see also State v. Reyes, 2001 UT 66, |^ 
12, 31 P.3d 516 (upholding minimum mandatory sentence for rape of a child); State v. 
Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994) (upholding minimum mandatory sentence for 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child); State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Utah 1989) 
(upholding minimum mandatory sentence for aggravated sexual assault); State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Utah 1988) (upholding minimum mandatory sentence 
for sodomy on child); State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1988) (upholding 
minimum mandatory sentence for aggravated sexual assault); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 
1032, 1034 (Utah 1987) (same); State v. Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762, 762 (Utah 1987) 
(upholding minimum mandatory sentence of for aggravated sexual abuse of a child); State 
v. Kaus, 744 P.2d 1375,1375 (Utah 1987) (same); Bishop, 111 P.2d at 264 (upholding 
minimum mandatory sentence for sodomy upon a child). 
Yet, the only Utah case to which defendant cites does not involve a challenge to a 
minimum mandatory sentence but rather imposition of a death penalty after conviction for 
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aggravated assault by a prisoner. See State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 631 (Utah 1997). 
Moreover, defendant cites the lead opinion without acknowledging that most of that 
opinion spoke for only two justices. See id. ("For purposes of clarity, it should be noted 
that only a portion of this opinion (part III.B.2) reflects the holding of a majority of the 
court (Justices Durham, Stewart, and Zimmerman)"); id. at 653 ("I join only in the last 
two paragraphs of section III.B.2 of Justice Durham's opinion."). 
Similarly, at least two United States Supreme Court cases have upheld minimum 
mandatory sentences in drug cases. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., lead opinion) (upholding mandatory life sentence 
without possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine); id. at 996 
(Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J. and Souter, J., concurring); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 
370, 370-72 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding consecutive 20-year sentences for possession 
with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana based on nine ounces of marijuana 
seized); cf. United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 1995) ("It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that, with a regularity bordering on the echolalic, courts have repulsed 
Eighth Amendment challenges to lengthy incarcerative sentences in drug cases."). 
Yet, defendant cites neither of those cases. Instead, she cites to Solem v. Helm, 
463 U.S. 277 (1983), which involved a life sentence imposed after uttering a bad check 
for $100. Moreover, defendant fails to acknowledge that the proportionality analysis 
applied in Solem was substantially narrowed by Harmelin, one of those very cases. See 
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Herrera, 1999 UT 64, at \ 46; flroww v. Mzy/e, 283 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Hutto v. Weber, 275 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2001); Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 
1282 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 217 (6th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 940 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367, 
368 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 1995). 
Because defendant has failed to acknowledge, let alone address, any of the case 
law upholding minimum mandatory sentences against constitutional challenge, she has 
also failed to provide any reasoned analysis as to why that authority should not apply to 
her sentence. This Court should therefore reject her claim as inadequately briefed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED jd June 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
thou- Q fJiuc^'t 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
U.S. Const, amend. 8 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Utah Const a r t I9 section 9 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; 
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or 
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1998) 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1999) 
58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), fe), or (f) is guilty of 
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
(e) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation or production or 
manufacture of a controlled or counterfeit substance involved or was 
conducted in the presence of a person less than 18 years of age; 
(f) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance; or 
(g) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
cocaine base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in 
Subsections (lXa) through (g) of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense. 
Utah R. App. P. 4 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under 
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
Similarly if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no 
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion 
as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, 
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed 
by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed 
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a 
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension 
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry 
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in 
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the 
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a 
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice 
of appeal. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999.) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new tnal in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropnety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in wnting and upon notice The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable 
(c) A motion for a new tnal shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
penod 
(d) If a new tnal is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
tnal had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
